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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-430

ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v. LANCE GATES ET ux.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF ILLINOIS
[May

JUSTICE BRENNAN,

, 1983]

dissenting.

Although I join JUSTICE STEVENS' dissenting opinion and
agree with him that the warrant is invalid even under the
Court's newly announced "totality of the circumstances" test,
see post, at 4-5, and n. 8, I write separately to dissent from
the Court's unjustified and ill-advised rejection of the twoprong test for evaluating the validity of a warrant based on
hearsay announced in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964),
and refined in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969).

I

The Court's current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as
reflected by today's unfortunate decision, patently disregards Justice Jackson's admonition in Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949):
"[Fourth Amendment rights] ... are not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so
effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of
the individual and putting terror in every heart. U ncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most
effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government ....
"But the right to be secure against searches and sei-
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zures is one of the most difficult to protect. Since the
officers are themselves the chief invaders, there is no enforcement outside of court." !d., at 180-181 (Jackson,
J. , dissen ting).
In recognition of the judiciary's role as the only effective
guardian of Fourth Amendment rights, this Court has developed over the last half century a set of coherent rules governing a magistrate's consideration of a warrant application and
the showings that are necessary to support a finding of probable cause. We start with the proposition that a neutral and
detached magistrate, and not the police, should determine
whether there is probable cause to support the issuance of a
warrant. In Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948),
the Court stated:

"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is
not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection
consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged
by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. . . .
When the right of
privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as
a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." ld., at 13--14
(footnote omitted).
See also Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 564 (1971);
Spinelli v. United States, supra, at 415; United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102, 109 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas,

supra, at 111; Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 270-271
(1960); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480, 486
(1958); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 464 (1932) . .
In order to emphasize the magistrate's role as an independent arbiter of probable cause and to insure that searches or
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seizures are not effected on less than probable cause, the
Court has insisted that police officers provide magistrates
with the underlying facts and circumstances that support the
officers' conclusions. In Nathanson v. United States, 290
U. S. 41 (1933), the Court held invalid a search warrant that
was based on a customs agent's "mere affirmation of suspicion and belief without any statement of adequate supporting
facts ." I d., at 46. The Court stated that "[Xu]nder the
Fourth Amendment, an officer may not properly issue a warrant to search a private dwelling unless he can find probable
cause therefor from facts or circumstances presented to him
under oath or affirmation. Mere affirmance of belief or suspicion is not enough." I d., at 4 7.
In Giordenello v. United States, supra, the Court re-

viewed an arrest warrant issued under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure based on a complaint sworn to by a Federal Bureau of Narcotics agent. I d., at 481. 1 Based on the
agent's testimony at the suppression hearing, the Court
noted that "until the warrant was issued ... [the agent's]
suspicions of petitioner's guilt derived entirely from information given him by law enforcement officers and other persons
in Houston, none of whom either appeared before the Commissioner or submitted affidavits." I d., at 485. The Court
found it unnecessary to decide whether a warrant could be
based solely on hearsay information, for the complaint was
"defective in not providing a sufficient basis upon which a
finding of probable cause could be made." Ibid.
In particular, the complaint contained no affirmative allegation that
the agent spoke with personal knowledge nor did it indicate
Although the warrant was issued under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the Court stated that "[t]he provisions of these Rules must be
read in light of the constitutional requirements they implement."
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480, 485 (1958). See Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 112, n. 3 (1964). ("The principles announced in
Giordenello derived ... from the Fourth Amendment, and not from our
supervisory power").
1
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any sources for the agent's conclusion. I d., at 486. The
Court expressly rejected the argument that these deficiencies could be cured by "the Commissioner's reliance upon a
presumption that the complaint was made on the personal
knowledge of the complaining officer." Ibid.
As noted, the Court did not decide the hearsay question
lurking in Giordenello. The use of hearsay to support the
issuance of a warrant presents special problems because informants, unlike police officers, are not regarded as presumptively reliable or honest. Moreover, the basis for an informant's conclusions are not always clear from an affidavit that \ s
merely reports those conclusions. If the conclusory allegations of a police officer are insufficient to support a finding of
probable cause, surely the conclusory allegations of an informant should a fortiori be insufficient.
In Jones v. United States, supra, the Court considered
"whether an affidavit which sets out personal observations
relating to the existence of cause to search is to be deemed
insufficient by virtue of the fact that it sets out not the affiant's observations but those of another." 362 U. S., at 269.
The Court held that hearsay information can support the issuance of a warrant "so long as a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay is presented." Ibid. The Court found that
there was a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay involved in Jones. The informant's report was based on the
informant's personal knowledge, and the informant previously had provided accurate information. Moreover, the informant's story was corroborated by other sources. Finally,
the defendant was known to the police to be a narcotics user.
!d., at 271.
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), merely made explicit what was implicit in Jones. In considering a search
warrant based on hearsay, the Court reviewed Nathanson
and Giordenello and noted the requirement established by
those c·a ses that an officer provide the magistrate with the
underlying facts or circumstances that support the officer's
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conclusion that there is probable cause to justify the issuance
of a warrant. The Court stated:
"The vice in the present affidavit is at least as great as
in Nathanson and Giordenello. Here, the 'mere conclusion' that petitioner possessed narcotics was not even
that of the affiant himself; it was that of an unidentified
informant. The affidavit here not only 'contains no affirmative allegation that the affiant spoke with personal
knowledge of the matters contained therein,' it does not
even contain an 'affirmative allegation' that the affiant's
unidentified source 'spoke with personal knowledge.'
For all that appears, the source here merely suspected,
believed or concluded that there were narcotics in petitioner's possession.
The magistrate here certainly
could not 'judge for himself the persuasiveness of the
facts relied on . . . to show probable cause.' He necessarily accepted 'without question' the informant's 'suspicion,' 'belief' or 'mere conclusion."' I d., at 113--114
(footnote omitted). 2
While recognizing that a warrant may be based on hearsay,
the Court established the following standard:
"[T]he magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they
were, and some of the underlying circumstances from
which the officer concluded that the informant, whose
The Court noted that approval of the affidavit before it "would open
the door to easy circumvention of the rule announced in Nathanson and
Giordenello." Aguilar v. Texas, supra, at 114, n. 4. The Court stated:
"A police officer who arrived at the 'suspicion,' 'belier or 'mere conclusion'
that narcotics were in someone's possession could not obtain a warrant.
But he could convey this conclusion to another police officer, who could
then secure the warrant by swearing that he had 'received reliable information from a credible person' that the narcotics were in someone's possession." Ibid.
2
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identity need not be disclosed . . . was 'credible' or his
information 'reliable.' Otherwise, 'the inferences from
the facts which lead to the complaint' will be drawn not
'by a neutral and detached magistrate,' as the Constitution requires, but instead, by a police officer 'engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime'
. . . or, as in this case, by an unidentified informant."
/d., at 114-115 (footnote omitted).

The Aguilar standard was refined in Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969). In Spinelli, the Court reviewed a search warrant based on an affidavit that was "more
ample," id., at 413, than the one in Aguilar. The affidavit in
Spinelli contained not only a tip from an informant, but also a
report of an independent police investigation that allegedly
corroborated the informant's tip. Ibid. Under these circumstances, the Court stated that it was "required to delineate the manner in which Aguilar's two-pronged test should

be applied. . . . " Ibid.
The Court held that the Aguilar test should be applied to
the tip, and approved two additional ways of satisfying that
test. First, the Court suggested that if the tip contained
sufficient detail describing the accused's criminal activity it
might satisfy Aguilar s basis of knowledge prong. ld., at
416. Such detail might assure the magistrate that he is "relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on
an individual's general reputation." Ibid. Although the tip
in the case before it did not meet this standard, "[t]he detail
provided by the informant in Draper v. United States, 358

U. S. 307 (1959), provide[d] a suitable benchmark," ibid., because "[a] magistrate, when confronted with such detail,

could reasonably infer that the informant had gained his information in a reliable way." !d., at 417 (footnote omitted). 3
There is some tension between Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307
(1959), and Aguilar. In Draper, the Court considered the validity of a
3
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Second, the Court stated that police corroboration of the
details of a tip could provide a basis for satisfying Aguilar.
I d., at 417. The Court's opinion is not a model of clarity on
this issue since it appears to suggest that corroboration can
satisfy both the basis of knowledge and veracity prongs of
warrantless arrest based on an informant's tip and police corroboration of
certain details of the tip. The informant, who in the past had always given
accurate and reliable information, told the police that Draper was peddling
narcotics. The informant later told the police that Draper had left for Chicago by train to pick up some heroin and would return by train on the
morning of one of two days. The informant gave the police a detailed
physical description of Draper and of the clothing he was wearing. The
informant also said that Draper would be carrying a tan zipper bag and
that he walked very fast. 358 U. S., at 309.
On the second morning specified by the informant, the police saw a man
"having the exact physical attributes and wearing the precise clothing described by [the informant], alight from an incoming Chicago train and start
walking 'fast' toward the exit." !d., at 309-310. The man was carrying a
tan zipper bag. The police arrested him and searched him incident to the
arrest. Ibid.
The Court found that the arrest had been based on probable cause.
Having verified every detail of the tip "except whether [Draper] had accomplished his mission and had the three ounces of heroin on his person or
in his bag," id., at 313, the police "had 'reasonable grounds' to believe that
the remaining unverified bit of [the informant's] information ... was likewise true." Ibid.
There is no doubt that the tip satisfied Aguilar s veracity prong. The
informant had given accurate information in the past. Moreover, under
Spinelli, the police corroborated most of the details of the informant's tip.
See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S., at 417; id., at 426-427 (WHITE, J.,
concWTing); infra, at
, and n. 4. There is some question, however,
about whether the tip satisfied Aguilar s basis of knowledge prong. The
fact that an informant is right about most things may suggest that he is
credible, but it does not establish that he has acquired his information in a
reliable way. See Spinelli v. United States, supra, at 426-427 (WHITE,
J., concurring). Spinelli's "self-verifying detail" element resolves this
tension. As one commentator has suggested, "under Spinelli, the Draper
decision is sound as applied to its facts." Note, The Informer's Tip As
Probable Cause for Search or Arrest, 54 Cornell L. Rev. 958, 964, n. 34

(1969).

j
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AJXLOar. I d., at 417-418. 4 JUSTICE WHITE's concurring
op1mon, however, points the way to a proper reading of the
Court's opinion. After reviewing the Court's decision in
Draper v. United States, supra, JUSTICE WHITE concluded
that "[t]he thrust of Draper is not that the verified facts have
independent significance with respect to proof of [another unverified fact]." !d., at 427. In his view, "[t]he argument instead relates to the reliability of the source: because an informant is right about some things, he is more probably right
about other facts, usually the critical, unverified facts."
Ibid. JUSTICE WHITE then pointed out that prior cases had
rejected "the notion that the past reliability of an officer is
sufficient reason for believing his current assertions." Ibid.
JUSTICE WHITE went on to state:
"Nor would it suffice, I suppose, if a reliable informant
4The Court stated that the FBI's independent investigative efforts
could not "support both the inference that the informer was generally
trustworthy and that he had made his charge against Spinelli on the basis
of infonnation obtained in a reliable way." Spinelli v. United States,
supra, at 417. The Court suggested that Draper again provided "a relevant comparison." Ibid. Once the police had corroborated most of the
details of the tip in Draper "[i]t was . . . apparent that the informant had

not been fabricating his report out of whole cloth; since the report was of
the sort which in common experience may be recognized as having been
obtained in a reliable way, it was perfectly clear that probable cause had
been established." I d., at 417-418.
It is the Court's citation of Draper which creates most of the confusion.
The informant's credibility was not at issue in Draper irrespective of the
corroboration of the details of his tip. See n. 3, supra. The Court's opinion, therefore, might be read as suggesting that corroboration also could
satisfy Aguilar's basis of knowledge test. I think it is more likely, how, that the Court simever, especially in view of the discussion infra, at
ply was discussing an alternative means of satisfying Aguilar's veracity
prong, using the facts of Draper as an example, and relying on its earlier
determination that the detail of the tip in Draper was self-verifying. See
393 U. S., at 416-417. It is noteworthy that although the affiant in
Spinelli had sworn that the informer was reliable, "he [had] offered the
magistrate no reason in support of this conclusion." I d., at 416.
Aguilar's veracity prong, therefore, was not satisfied. Ibid.

81-430--DISSENT
ILLINOIS v. GATES

9

states there is gambling equipment in Apartment 607
and then proceeds to describe in detail Apartment 201, a
description which is verified before applying for the warrant. He was right about 201, but that hardly makes
h1m more believable about the equipment in 607. But
what if he states that there are narcotics locked in a safe
in Apartment 300, which is described in detail, and the
apartment manager verifies everything but the contents
of the safe? I doubt that the report about the narcotics
is made appreciably more believable by the verification.
The informant could still have gotten his information
concerning the safe from others about whom nothing is
known or could have inferred the presence of narcotics
from circumstances which a magistrate would find unacceptable." I d., at 427.
I find this reasoning persuasive. Properly understood,
therefore, Spinelli stands for the proposition that corroboration of certain details in a tip may be sufficient to satisfy the
veracity, but not the basis of knowledge, prong of Aguilar.
As noted, Spinelli also suggests that in some limited circumstances considerable detail in an informant's tip may be adequate to satisfy the basis of knowledge prong of Aguilar. 5
Although the rules drawn from the cases discussed above
are cast in procedural terms, they advance an important underlying substantive value: Findings of probable cause, and
After concluding that the tip was not sufficient to support a finding of
probable cause, the Court stated:
"Th is not to say that the tip was so insubstantial that it could not properly have counted in the magistrate's determination. Rather, it needed
some further support. When we look to the other parts of the application,
however, we find nothing alleged which would permit the suspicions engendered by the informant's report to ripen into a judgment that a crime
was probably being committed." Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S., at
418.
The Court went on to suggest that corroboration of incriminating facts
would be needed. See ibid.
5
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attendant intrusions, should not be authorized unless there is
some assurance that the information on which they are based
has been obtamed m a reliable way by an honest or credible
person. As applied to police officers the rules focus on the
way in which the information was acquired. As applied to
mform.ants, the rules focus both on the honesty or credibility )
of the informant and on the reliability of the way in which the
mformatwn was acquired. Insofar as it is more complicated,
an evaluation of affidavits based on hearsay involves a more
difficult inquiry. This suggests a need to structure the inquiry in an effort to insure greater accuracy. The standards
announced in Aguilar, as refined by Spinelli, fulfill that
need. The standards inform the police of what information
they have to provide and magistrates of what information
they should demand. The standards also inform magistrates
of the subsidiary findings they must make in order to arrive
at an ultimate finding of probable cause. Spinelli, properly
understood, directs the magistrate's attention to the possibility that the presence of self-verifying detail might satisfy
Aguilar's basis of knowledge prong and that corroboration of
the details of a tip might satisfy Aguilar's veracity prong.
By requiring police to provide certain crucial information to
magistrates and by structuring magistrates' probable cause
inquiries, Aguilar and Spinelli assure the magistrate's role
as an independent arbiter of probable cause, insure greater
accuracy in probable cause determinations, and advance the
substantive value identified above.
Until today the Court has never squarely addressed the
application of the Aguilar and Spinelli standards to tips from
anonymous informants. Both Aguilar and Spinelli dealt
with tips from informants known at least to the police. See
also, e. g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146 (1972);

United States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 573, 575 (1971); Whiteley
v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 565 (1971); McCray v. Illinois, 386
U. S. 300, 302 (1967); Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257,
268-269 (1960). And surely there is even more reason to
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subject anonymous informants' tips to the tests established

By definition nothing is known
about an anonymous mformant's identity, honesty, or relia ility. One commentator has suggested that anonymous informants should be treated as presumptively unreliable.
See Comment, Anonymous Tips, Corroboration, and Probable Cause: Reconciling The Spinelli!Draper Dichotomy in Illinois v. Gates, 20 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 99, 107 (1982). See
also Adams v. Williams, supra, at 146 (suggesting that an
anonymous telephone tip provides a weaker case for a Terry
stop than a tip from an informant known to the police who
had provided information in the past); United States v. Harris, supra, at 599 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("We cannot assume that the ordinary law-abiding citizen has qualms about
[appearing before a magistrate]"). In any event, there certainly is no basis for treating anonymous informants as presumptively reliable. Nor is there any basis for assuming
that the information provided by an anonymous informant
has been obtained in a reliable way. If we are unwilling to
accept conclusory allegations from the police, who are presumptively reliable, or from informants who are known, at
least to the police, there cannot possibly be any rational basis
for accepting conclusory allegations from anonymous
informants.
To suggest that anonymous informants' tips are subject to
the tests established by Aguilar and Spinelli is not to suggest that they can never provide a basis for a finding of probable cause. It is conceivable that police corroboration of the
details of the tip might establish the reliability of the informant under Aguilar's veracity prong, as refined in Spinelli,
and that the details in the tip might be sufficient to qualify
under the "self-verifying detail" test established by Spinelli
as a means of satisfying Aguilar's basis of knowledge prong.
The Aguilar and Spinelli tests must be applied to anonymous
informants' tips, however, if we are to continue to insure that
findings of probable cause, and attendant intrusions, are
Y

guil ar and Spinelli.
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based on info
ti
i
.
rma tion provided by an honest or credible person who has acquired the information in a reliable way 6
I.n light of the important purposes served by Aguilar and
Spinelli, I would not reject the standards they establish. If
anything, I simply would make more clear that Spinelli,
properly understood, does not depart in any fundamental
way from the test established by Aguilar. For reasons I
shall next state, I do not find persuasive the Court's justifications for rejecting the test established by Aguilar and refined
by Spinelli.
As noted, supra, at
, Aguilar and Spinelli inform the police
of what information they have to provide and magistrates of what information they should demand. This advances the important process value,
which is intimately related to substantive Fourth Amendment concerns, of
having magistrates, rather than police, or informants, determine whether
there is probable cause to support the issuance of a warrant. We want the
police to provide magistrates with the information on which they base their
conclusions so that magistrates can perform their important function.
When the police rely on facts about which they have personal knowledge,
requiring them to disclose those facts to magistrates imposes no significant
burden on the police. When the police rely on information obtained from
confidential informants, requiring the police to disclose the facts on which
the informants based their conclusions imposes a more substantial burden
on the police, but it is one that they can meet because they presumably
have access to their confidential informants.
In cases in which the police rely on information obtained from an anonymous informant, the police, by hypothesis, cannot obtain further infonnation from the informant regarding the facts and circumstances on which the
informant based his conclusion. When the police seek a warrant based
solely on an anonymous informant's tip, therefore, they are providing the
magistrate with all the information on which they have based their conclusion. In this respect, the command of Aguilar and Spinelli has been met
and the process value identified above has been served. But Aguilar and
Spinelli advance other values which argue for their application even to
anonymous informant's tips. They structure the magistrate's probable
cause inquiry and, more importantly, they guard against findings of probable cause, and attendant intrusions, based on anything other than information which magistrates reasonably can conclude has been obtained in a reliable way by an honest or credible person.
6
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II

In rejecting the A il
. .
gests that a "tot Aguil ar-Spinelli standards, the Court suga I Y of the circumstances approach is far
more Consist ent with
than i
. .
our prior treatment of probable cause
s. any rigid demand that specific 'tests' be satisfied by
every Informant's tip." Ante, at 15-16 (footnote omitted).
In support of this proposition the Court relies on several
cases that purportedly reflect this approach, ante, at 15, n. 6,
17, n. 7, and on the "practical, nontechnical," ante, at 16, nature of probable cause.
Only one of the cases cited by the Court in support of its
"totality of the circumstances" approach, Jaben v. United
States, 381 U. S. 214 (1965), was decided subsequent to
Aguilar. It is by no means inconsistent with Aguilar.7
The other three cases 8 cited by the Court as supporting its
7

In Jaben v. United States, 381 U. S. 214 (1965), the Court considered

whether there was probable cause to support a complaint charging petitioner with willfully filing a false tax return. I d., at 221. After reviewing
the extensive detail contained in the complaint, id., at 223, the Court expressly distinguished tax offenses from other types of offenses:
"Some offenses are subject to putative establishment by blunt and concise
factual allegations, e. g., 'A saw narcotics in B's possession,' whereas 'A
saw B file a false tax return' does not mean very much in a tax evasion
case. Establishment of grounds for belief that the offense of tax evasion
has been committed often requires a reconstruction of the taxpayer's income from many individually unrevealing facts which are not susceptible of
a concise statement in a complaint. Furthermore, unlike narcotics informants, for example, whose credibility may often be suspect, the sources in
this tax evasion case are much less likely to produce false or untrustworthy
information. Thus, whereas some supporting information concerning the
credibility of informants in narcotics cases or other common garden varieties of crime may be required, such information is not so necessary in the
context of the case before us." I d., at 223-224.
Obviously, Jaben is not inconsistent with Aguilar and involved no general
rejection of the Aguilar standards.
8
Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U. S. 528 (1964); Ker v. California,
374 U. S. 23 (1963); Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 (1960).

14
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I
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.l
pinelli reflect. As noted see supra at - A guilar
in ll"i reqmre
ir the police' to provide
' magis-'
t
.and spinel
rates with certain crucial information. They also provide
structure for magistrates' probable cause inquiries. In so
dOI.ng, Aguilar and Spinelli preserve the role of magistrates
as Independent arbiters of probable cause, insure greater accuracy In probable cause determinations, and advance the
substantive value of precluding findings of probable cause,
and attendant intrusions, based on anything less than information from an honest or credible person who has acquired his information in a reliable way. Neither the standards nor their effects are inconsistent with a "practical,
nontechnical" conception of probable cause. Once a magistrate has determined that he has information before him that
he can reasonably say has been obtained in a reliable way by
a credible person, he has ample room to use his common
sense and to apply a practical, nontechnical conception of
probable cause.
It also should be emphasized that cases such as Nathanson
v. United States, 290 U. S. 41 (1933), and Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U. S. 480 (1958), discussed supra, at
- - , directly contradict the Court's suggestion, ante,
at 18, that a strong showing on one prong of the Aguilar test
should compensate for a deficient showing on the other. If
the conclusory allegations of a presumptively reliable police
officer are insufficient to establish probable cause, there is no
conceivable reason why the conclusory allegations of an anonymous informant should not be insufficient as well. Moreover, contrary to the Court's implicit suggestion, Aguilar
and Spinelli do not stand as an insuperable barrier to the use
A
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onsistent with deference to magistrates'
knowl a IOns of probable cause. Aguilar expressly acedged that reviewing courts "will pay substantial defia 1 determinations of probable cause. . .. "
erence t ° ju
ju diicial
378 U. S., at 111. In Spinelli the Court noted that it was
not retreating from the proposition that magistrates' determinations of probable cause "should be paid great deference
by reviewing courts. . .. " 393 U. S., at 419. It is also
noteworthy that the language from United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102, 108--109 (1965), which the Court repeatedly quotes, see ante, at 20, 21, and n. 10, brackets the
following passage, which the Court does not quote:
"This is not to say that probable cause can be made out
by affidavits which are purely conclusory, stating only
the affiant's or an informer's belief that probable cause
exists without detailing any of the 'underlying circumstances' upon which that belief is based. See Aguilar v.
Texas, supra. Recital of some of the underlying circumstances in the affidavit is essential if the magistrate is to
perform his detached function and not serve merely as a
rubber stamp for the police. However, where these circumstances are detailed, where reason for crediting the
source of the information is given, and when a magis-
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The Court also argues that "[i]f the affidavits submitted by police officers are subjected to the type of scrutiny some courts have deemed appropriate, police nught well resort to warrantless searches, with the hope of
re.lymg on consent or some other exception to the warrant clause that
nnght develop at the time of the search." Ante, at 21. If the Court is
suggesting, as it appears to be, that the police will intentionally disregard
the law, it need only be noted in response that the courts are not helpless to
deal with such conduct. Moreover, as was noted in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971):
"[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this area is that 'searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate,
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' The exceptions are 'jealously and carefully drawn,' and there must be 'a showing by
those who seek exemption . . . that the exigencies of the situation made
that course imperative.' '[T]he burden is on those seeking the exemption
to show the need for it."' I d., at 454-455 (plurality opinion) (footnotes
omitted).
It therefore would appear to be not only inadvisable, but also unavailing,
for the police to conduct warrantless searches in "the hope of relying on
consent or some other exception to the warrant clause that might develop
at the time of the search." Ante, at 21.
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findings of probable cause are based on information that a
magistrate can reasonably say has been obtained in a reliable
way by an honest or credible person. I share JUSTICE
White's fear that the Court's rejection of Aguilar and
Spinelli and its adoption of a new totality of the circumstances test, ante, at 23, "may foretell an evisceration of the
probable cause standard .... " Ante, at 26 (WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment).
III

The Court's complete failure to provide any persuasive reason for rejecting Aguilar and Spinelli doubtlessly reflects impatience with what it perceives to be "overly technical" rules
governing searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Words such as "practical," "nontechnical," and "commonsense," as used in the Court's opinion, are but code
words for an ove
is iv ttitude towards police practices in derogation of the rights secured by the Fourth
Amendment. Everyone shares the Court's concern over the
horrors of drug trafficking, but under our Constitution only
measures consistent with the Fourth Amendment may be
employed by government to cure this evil. We must be ever
mindful of Justice Stewart's admonition in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), that "[i]n times of unrest,
whether caused by crime or racial conflict or fear of internal
subversion, this basic law and the values that it represents
may appear unrealistic or 'extravagant' to some. But the
values were those of the authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts." I d., at 455 (plurality opinion). In the
same vein, Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 (1942),
warned that "[s]teps innocently taken may, one by one, lead
to the irretrievable impairment of substantial liberties."
/d., at 86.
Rights secured by the Fourth Amendment are particularly
difficult to protect because their "advocates are usually crimi-

nals." Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307, 314 (1959)
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(Douglas J d is
in
.
' ., issenting). But the rules "we fashion [are] for
the Innocent and guilty alike." Ibid. See also Kolender v.
Lawson, .
U. S.
,
(1983) (BRENNAN, J., concurrmg); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 181 (1949)
(Jackson, J., dissenting). By replacing Agui lar and Spinelli
Wlth a test that provides no assurance that magistrates,
rather than the police, or informants, will make determinations of probable cause; imposes no structure on magistrates'
probable cause inquiries; and invites the possibility that intrusions may be justified on less than reliable information
from an honest or credible person, today's decision threatens
to "obliterate one of the most fundamental distinctions between our form of government, where officers are under the
law, and the police-state where they are the law." Johnson
v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 17 (1948) .
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